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ABSTRACT In this essay I analyse the different modalities of thought that 
occur between philosophy and moving images, beginning with Gilles Deleuze’s 
metaphilosophical distinction between “thinking” and “philosophizing”. This 
is an essential distinction for the possible elaboration of a film philosophy, or 
at least one which claims that “film philosophizes,” a thesis that is nowadays 
immerged in a certain misconstruction. In this sense, I suggest, as a conceivable 
resolution to this misunderstanding, a more proper Deleuzian designation 
of “thinking with concepts” and “thinking with images,” in a fundamental 
reciprocal process between the philosophical and non-philosophical fields of 
the arts. Starting with an introduction to Deleuze’s noology and a description 
of these ideas and their aesthetic value, I proceed with a closer analysis of 
moving images, metaphors, and film adaptation in order to question, within a 
post-continental-analytic approach, whether film philosophizes.
Keywords Deleuze, philosophy of film, metaphilosophy, noology, moving 
image.
RESUMO Neste ensaio analiso as diferentes modalidades de pensamento 
que ocorrem entre a filosofia e as imagens em movimento partindo da distinção 
metafilosófica elaborada por Gilles Deleuze entre “pensar” e “filosofar”. 
Esta é uma distinção fundamental para a possível elaboração de uma filosofia 
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do cinema, ou, pelo menos, para afirmar que “o cinema filosofa”, uma tese 
atualmente imersa num certo equívoco. Neste sentido, como possível resolução 
para tal mal-entendido, sugiro uma adequada designação deleuziana de “pensar 
com conceitos” e “pensar com imagens”, num processo recíproco fundamental 
entre o campo filosófico e o não filosófico das artes. Começando com uma 
introdução à noologia em Deleuze e uma descrição dessas ideias e do seu 
valor estético, prossigo com uma análise mais detalhada sobre imagens em 
movimento, metáforas e adaptação cinematográfica de modo a, dentro de uma 
abordagem pós-continental e pós-analítica, questionar se o cinema filosofa.
Palavras-chave Deleuze, filosofia do cinema, metafilosofia, noologia, 
imagem em movimento.
1 Introduction: Thinking Films
What is truly involved in defending that “film thinks” or that “film 
philosophizes”? Are these statements equivalents or antonyms? In defending 
one statement (either that “film thinks” or that “film philosophizes”), the other 
must by obligation be rejected (“So, film thinks, but it does not philosophize?”)? 
Could a Deleuzian metaphilosophical definition of what it means to think 
with images be suitable to resolve this continental-analytic gap? To consider 
this metaphilosophically means to first establish a plane of immanence that 
defines “philosophy”, “concept”, and “thinking” – the philosophical praxis. 
This problem, before being resolved with the potentially distinct modalities of 
all “philosophical films,” of all possible works, must answer to the possibility 
of having a kind of philosophy that has not only a linguistic nature but also an 
audio-visual one. This means opening the philosophical field to new ways of 
expression, to challenge what we think the philosophical praxis to be.
With this article, my aim is to show the Deleuzian conditions for a film 
to think—whenever it creates sensations that persist, through employing a 
composition of affects and percepts that do not rely on the human (sentiendum). 
A film provides us a possible world that is self-referential and autopoietic, but 
its thought should not be in the screenplay or in its dialogues (verbal language) 
though may exist in between images and sounds (a montage is the assemblage 
of movement-images). 
Thus, as we will see, a filmmaker thinks in terms of audio-visual sensations. 
Yet, the philosophical concept of the movement-image is not simple: it can 
perfectly be Griffith’s close-ups in The Musketeers of Pig Alley, Chaplin’s 
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index of equivocity in The Idle Class, or Godard’s faux raccords in Breathless, 
but it is never just a moment of recognition. In this sense, Griffith, Chaplin 
and Godard think about movement, time and gesture because their close-ups, 
indices of equivocity and faux raccords, their ideas seen as pre-concepts, are 
violent toward our normal way of feeling and thinking (by mere recognition): 
these ideas are unexpected and unexperienced until that moment.
Daniel Frampton argues that film’s essence is to think, by which it opens 
“another future” for philosophy itself—for “another kind of philosophy” (2006, 
p. 183). So, let us imagine that film thinks. How do we realize this? So many 
movies have made us think about distinctive subjects: Griffith’s The Musketeers 
of Pig Alley (1912), Chaplin’s The Idle Class (1921), Vertov’s The Man With a 
Moving Camera (1929), Buñuel’s Land Without Bread (1933), Ozu’s Tokyo Story 
(1953), Godard’s Breathless (1960), Ford’s The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance 
(1962), Varda’s Cléo from 5 to 7 (1962), Snow’s Wavelength (1967), Tarkovsky’s 
The Mirror (1975), Haneke’s Funny Games (1997), Nolan’s Memento (2000), 
Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing (2012), to name just a few. For one reason 
or another, we find something thought provoking in these movies. But when 
we claim that these films think, we are not attributing them with a specific or 
unique characteristic that would differentiate them from other forms of art. In 
fact, other forms of art can also think by creating autopoietic sensations in the 
realm of the possible. We can think through painting, photography, music or 
any other art form. But what kind of image of thought is involved here when 
we claim that “film thinks”? 
2 A Deleuzian Noology
According to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, to think is not an exclusively 
philosophical event since we not only think philosophically with concepts, but 
may also think in a non-philosophical way with sensations, through percepts 
(which are not perception: for example, the intensity of Pollock’s paintings) 
and affects (which are impersonal and independent of emotions or feelings: the 
intensity of the tides of Mont Saint Michel in Malick’s To the Wonder (2012); 
Francis Bacon’s figures, for instance).
Although diverse artistic forms of expression have the ability to force us 
to think, only philosophy can make us think it in a philosophical way. Yet, this 
is not a tautological argument as long as philosophy is defined as the creative 
process of producing and thinking with concepts (Deleuze; Guattari, 1994, p. 
5). Therefore, what is tautological is to claim that to think philosophically is 
to think conceptually. 
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Our quest is towards the difference between “philosophizing” and “thinking 
otherwise”, as only the first would be exclusive to philosophy itself, and thus 
unachievable by other modes of expression. I am also looking for the connections 
between thinking philosophically and thinking otherwise, limited here to its 
connection with art and artistic thought. 
What do we mean by “thinking”? Deleuze argues that all philosophical 
thinking requires an “image of thought” (2010, pp. 118-126)—What are the 
conditions of thought? How is an idea expressed? Why should we think?—
which is a pre-philosophical plane of immanence for philosophy itself. Thinking 
always requires moral assumptions, either explicit or implicit, either objective or 
subjective (like the Cartesian cogito), on what it means to think, to be oriented 
within thought—after all, everyone knows what it means to think. 
in Nietzsche and Philosophy (from 1962), Deleuze developed the problem 
of describing and outlining what an image of thought is, and its role in thought. 
In this book Deleuze devotes a whole chapter to the “new image of thought” 
by developing the three theses of dogmatic thinking: the classical image of 
thought of recognition opposed to the modern image of thought, which is non-
representational. However, it would only be in Proust and Signs (1964), where 
he would relate the image of thought to the question of the “truth of time” 
(Deleuze, 2000, p. 94). There, for the first time, following Nietzsche’s idea 
that the main element of thought is no longer the truth but the value and sense, 
he sustained the inner, inseparable connection between the arts and thought (a 
new image of thought: the truth vs. value). In this sense, Marcel Proust as a 
novelist created an image of thought different from that created by philosophers. 
A few years later, in a 1968 interview (about the re-edition of Nietzsche’s 
complete work), Deleuze would state: “Godard transforms cinema by introducing 
thought into it. He didn’t have thoughts on cinema, he doesn’t put more or less 
valid thought into cinema; he starts cinema thinking” (2003, p. 141). However, 
even if in The Time-Image (almost twenty years later), the artists are seen as 
philosophers, in What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze seems to be more prudent when 
working with Guattari by declaring that the artists are “almost-philosophers.”
What separates artists and philosophers and, besides the difference, what 
bonds them? Philosophers can only create what needs to be created, when they 
feel forced to think something new, thus feeling the pressure of the outside on the 
philosophical field (Where…? How…? When…?). This intensive encounter with 
the outside, the non-philosophical field, is a necessary step to create something 
new philosophically (from the sentiendum towards the cogitandum). Therefore, 
if we only think forced by external aggressions, it means that to think is not a 
natural exercise. What is normal to a philosophical work is assuring that this 
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pre-philosophical plane becomes philosophical by being inhabited by concepts. 
Deleuze explains:
One might call this study of images of thought “noology” and see it as the prolegomena 
to philosophy. It’s what Difference and Repetition is really about, the nature of the 
postulates of the image of thought. And the question runs right through The Logic of 
Sense, where height, depth, and surface are taken as the coordinates of thinking; I come 
back to it in Proust and Signs, because Proust confronts the Greek image with all the 
power of signs; then I come to it again, with Felix, in A Thousand Plateaus, because the 
rhizome’s the image of thought that spreads out beneath the tree image (1995, p. 149).
One of the consequences of this Deleuzian noology, despite its variations, 
would precisely be that of the unnatural and “involuntary” origin of thought, 
in a Heideggerian sense—the genesis of thought is not in itself but outside, it 
is heterogenetic (Viegas, 2013). With this heterogenetic quality, we somehow 
guarantee that there is no hierarchy between disciplines, that philosophy is not 
a privileged, superior discipline, and that its function is concrete and does not 
dilute itself into abstraction.
With the heterogenetic origin of philosophical thinking we go a little further 
in our quest. But the problem that I wish to focus on and develop here regards 
the claim that film philosophizes. I wish to demonstrate that although a film 
(or another artistic form) can make us think, even think in a philosophical way 
(such as ethical dilemmas, legal injustices, or existential crises, for example), 
it does not think philosophically—unless we state that to think philosophically 
may be something else other than to think conceptually.
3 Plato and the Realm of Shadows
What different kinds of interferences occur between moving images and 
philosophy? What is the role of a philosophy of film and of thinking film in our 
everyday life? Philosophy and art differ not only in the nature of their thinking 
expression, but also in their qualities—even if between them “disturbing affinities 
appear on what seems to be a common plane of immanence” (Deleuze, 1994, 
p. 91). These kinds of intrinsic interferences occur when one slides onto the 
other’s plane. 
So, why choose film to understand these different qualities? First of all, 
we may think that there has been a close relationship between philosophy 
and images in general, from the moment philosophers began using images as 
a common philosophical rhetorical resource. It is precisely at this level that 
the general comparison between film and Plato’s Allegory of the Cave will be 
relevant to our analysis (Bauer, 2005, p. 44). However, more important than the 
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physical resemblance between the film spectator and the Cave prisoner, and the 
movie theatre and the cave, are their differences, which I intend to point out.
Nowadays, to say that films are philosophically relevant is quite a familiar 
and popular assertion. But, how did philosophers receive moving images? In 
which sense is film relevant to the philosophical field? How can we articulate 
film within a philosophical development, instead of a mere artistic illustration/
adaptation of the philosophical work? Both philosophical concepts and aesthetic-
non-philosophical images express a diversity of thought. Deleuze did not claim 
there was a clear autonomy between disciplines. On the contrary, he advocated 
that “between” disciplines there is an asymmetric resonance oriented by that 
common “noological” element which can mutually suggest and stimulate new 
ways of philosophical and artistic expression. Philosophy needs this non-
philosophical field. 
In the particular field of philosophical studies on image and the imagination, 
such as those by Jean-Paul Sartre or Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze (1995, 
p. 47) notes the singular place of Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory. indeed, 
Bergson’s doctoral thesis, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data 
of Consciousness (1889), along with Matter and Memory (1896) are considered 
two fundamental works of the “philosophical revolution” which occurred at 
the end of the nineteenth century against the naïve ontology of common sense 
that tended to “reify” the images as a copy of reality (Sartre, 2012). This theory 
tended to ontologically understate the role of images (understood as superficial 
copies) regarding the things they are images of. In his 1907 work The Creative 
Evolution, Bergson highlighted, on the negative criticism he made of the 
cinematograph, the inertia of the film audience toward the images seen on the 
screen (1970, p. 753).
This idea was widely generalized and was at the origin of the famous analogy 
made between the movie theatre and the Allegory of the Cave. The common 
analogy between the Cave and the cinematic phenomenological experience 
has only contributed to the increasing devaluation and general depreciation, by 
aesthetics and the philosophy of art, of the cinematographic art as a valuable 
and independent philosophical field of studies (Jarvie, 1999, p. 418).
Plato (1991) created the visual metaphorical idea of a cave where prisoners, 
unable to move and forced to look just at the shadows that appear in front of 
them, consider those shadows as reality itself, unaware of their true nature. 
They only see “shadows of” the reality (514a). In order to access the true 
nature of their situation, to see outside that confined space, they would need to 
free themselves, abandon the cave and confront reality for what it is. With that 
empowered knowledge, they would abandon their previous beliefs (previously 
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taken in a dogmatic and uncritical way) and question the information transmitted 
by their senses. The Platonic question was not centred on an aversion towards 
all images per se—as he himself used images in a pedagogical manner, as 
mental experiments—rather, it was focused on the etymologic origin of ideas 
or forms at the eidos—images as intelligible models.
Hence, a revision of the Platonic theory of Ideas is concomitant with the 
revision of a modern visual cultural theory of images. Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) 
has functioned as a well-known case study. Somehow, “Vertigo is, in a sense, 
the ultimate anti-Platonic film” (Žižek, 2004, p. 157): Scottie (James Stewart) 
finds out that the copy that deceived him turns out to be the only possible 
original. Indeed, this film is directly related to the Platonic theory of Ideas with 
its distinction between original, copy, and simulacrum, though it does so by 
reverting its original structure. Thus, if the first shock is the acknowledgment 
that the original was the copy, the most important shock in this anti-Platonic 
revision is, as Žižek notes, to acknowledge that the copy of a copy is indeed 
the only possible original (Judy, as Madeleine). Therefore, the shadows of 
shadows correspond to the material life of the projected photograms and not 
to real objects. 
“Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over 
copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections” 
(Deleuze, 1994, p. 66). In his aim to overcome Platonism, after Difference 
and Repetition and Logic of Sense, Deleuze gradually moves away from the 
concept of simulacrum to rhizome (even if he still uses it in Francis Bacon). 
The Deleuzian simulacrum is not the representational link between an original 
model and a copy. Rather, it is the rhizomatic and intensive series of copies that 
are divergent from a possible original model. Simulacra do not pretend to be the 
original; they do not imitate—they repeat, as in Andy Warhol’s serial art work. 
In the Deleuzian ontology of the dialectical game between real and actual, the 
simulacrum opposes itself not to reality but to the copy. Much of Deleuze’s 
criticism of the Platonic metaphysical dualism, which has an analytical and 
disjunctive opposition, subsists here. For Deleuze, copy and simulacrum are 
not equivalent (1990, p. 257) because the simulacrum is not self-oriented by 
the resemblance criteria to reality; it does not want to deceive or be something 
else (in the same sense that a falsification of a painting wants to be the original 
painting).
We are looking for a way out of the cave, if possible by paradoxically 
defending a Platonic perspective on the Greek paideia and its present version. 
Just as images and allegories were used by philosophers to educate and to 
express their conceptual work, moving images can be understood as a modern 
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pedagogical tool for new ways to perceive and to feel, new ways to think (Viegas, 
2016). Indeed, in the 1986 preface that Deleuze wrote for Serge Daney’s Ciné-
Journal, he argues for “new audio-visual combinations and major pedagogical 
lines” (1995, p. 71). Just as the Platonic allegory is guided by the Greek ideal 
of a paideia, despite its misleading element, we may say that there will be a 
pedagogical use of moving images. The idea of paideia, more than the allegory 
per se, is fundamental to the study of cinema as a public, free and anonymous 
education. In fact, the philosophy of film argues for the return of the philosophical 
domain to the public sphere, the ágora, a return to the original Greek roots. 
Philosophy of film today is far from the Greek ideal of paideia, at least in its 
Deleuzian analysis—as a non-knowledge without the negative element that is 
normally associated with it (Deleuze, 1994, p. 180).
However, if moving images force us to review the optical illusion and the 
cerebral cortex connection between what the technical mechanism and what the 
automatism are, in Deleuze, a philosophy of film will be seen as a conceptual 
practice and not only as a case study for the aesthetic field. This means that 
Deleuze understands film as a new experience, as a possible field in which to 
create new percepts and affects, the elements that constitute his logic of sensation. 
Although Deleuze does not conceptualize the role of the spectator, he defines 
the creation of a subjectivity that is particular to the cinematic experience with 
moving images, which does not reduce itself to a psychological analysis (as 
the question of the gaze, voyeurism, identification, empathy, …) but which 
centres itself on possible new ways of thinking. This thinking does not have 
to be human any more. The viewer’s experience is different from the natural, 
ordinary experience in its quotidian world: with non-human thoughts and non-
human sensations. The new ways of feeling and thinking will be reflected in 
a new sensibility towards reality itself, expanding consciousness beyond its 
natural limits.
4 Spiritual Life
Temporal relations are never seen in ordinary perception, but they can be seen in the 
image, provided the image is creative. The image renders visible, and creative, the 
temporal relations which cannot be reduced to the present. (Deleuze, 2007, p. 290)
The affects and percepts belong at their inception to a temporal subjectivity 
that is not time but is in time. Sensations give thoughts a body. In this case, the 
difference “mediates and is mediated” by the same, the opposite, and the similar. 
279DELEUZE AND FILM’S PHILOSOPHICAL VALUE
How can we grasp this pre-individual and pre-representational state? If 
cinema is the art of repetition (the continuous, infinite mechanical reproduction of 
movies), then how can we escape this closed scheme and look for the difference 
that differs in cinema? Where does difference lie in the classification of all the 
cinematographic signs? According to Deleuze, in becoming: at the temporality 
between moving images. The creation of philosophical concepts, of scientific 
functions, and the creation of artistic sensations will correspond to the three 
independent modes that the brain has as a “junction—not a unity—of the three 
planes” (Deleuze; Guattari, 1994, p. 208), to struggle against chaos towards 
the organized tension between the finite and the infinite, the actual and the 
virtual. The cinematographic mechanism is closer to the human mind through 
the processes of connecting the particular elements of each, i.e., images and 
ideas. Cinema can thus be a form of providing images, of becoming and making 
visible mental processes, not so much in the sense of an “image-of-thinking”, 
but as moving images that think and which force us to think. In this case we 
then have thinking-images. 
The cinematographic machine through self-moving images moves the mind, 
the spiritual life of the spectator: “Cinema puts movement not just in the image; 
it puts it in the mind. Spiritual life is the movement of the mind” (Deleuze, 
2007, p. 288). Thus, it has all the importance of liberating the spectator’s 
mind from the intellectual passivity characteristic of the Cave prisoners, of a 
torpid mind not in the sense of images in general, seen as shadows of another 
reality, but torpid as in the cliché of recognition and representation (the same). 
This liberation as a struggle against cliché is announced at the end of The 
Movement-image. In modern cinema, the filmmaker’s main task will be that of 
fighting against cliché, breaking with the mechanistic structure and revealing 
the cliché qua cliché, thus creating a new cinematographic image that makes 
us think differently, that make us feel otherwise, just as happened during the 
cinematographic avant-gardes of the 1920s and 1950s. 
In this sense, John Mullarkey supports the idea that the time-image is the 
thematization of the movement-image itself; it thematises the excesses of the 
movement-images clichés (2008, p. 93). The time-image is the “awareness of 
the clichés”, marked by “dispersive situations”, by the “weak connection” or 
the “form-ballade”. The new cinematographic images are less interested in 
representing an external model (easy recognition of the common-place), and 
more interested in showing the character seeing what he sees, listening to what 
he hears (intensive encounters), becoming themselves signs: “it is an image 
of an image.” In this sense, Deleuze’s preference for the time-image would 
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be explained by the argument that if cinema repeats the history of philosophy 
(Mullarkey, 2008, p. 87), then the time-image would be an improved image.
Although we do not want to overvalue the time-image over the movement-
image (Martin-Jones, 2011, p. 7), we understand why Deleuze’s interest in 
cinema was directly connected to a previous philosophical interest, a concern 
with the purpose of philosophy itself: of finding a new sense for philosophical 
expression. First, films allowed him to think about, among other questions, the 
deterritorialization of the Cartesian cogito and the dogmatic image of thought 
from that philosophical tradition. Through cinema, Deleuze considered other 
ways of seeing and feeling, but he considered philosophical thinking from a 
different perspective, on a philosophical path that goes from film to philosophy, 
and vice-versa. If Deleuze argued that “the brain is the screen”, he also argued 
that “the eye isn’t the camera, it’s the screen” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 54) in this 
way criticizing phenomenological interpretations that insist on the camera-eye 
analogy, already debated by one of the pioneers of the psychology of film, 
Hugo Münsterberg. 
We need to go forward in this analogy between the camera and the 
human mind within a pre-individual ontological model. Despite the analogy 
between the brain and the screen, Deleuze does not limit the relationship to the 
phenomenological camera-eye analogy, which tends to anthropomorphize the 
camera by considering it as having a point of view or a subject, identical either 
to the perspective of the character/actor or to the standpoint of the filmmaker/
screenwriter. Foremost, Deleuze also discards the traditional relationship 
between a subject and an object. The brain is the subject, a “brain-thought”, 
a brain-screen that utters “I” as a spirit which conceives philosophically and 
which feels artistically. Thus, the primordial relationship in the philosophical 
field, according the Deleuzian terminology, occurs between the brain and 
chaos. According to the Bergsonian definition of the universe, everything is a 
matter-image including one’s own brain, but between the matter-image of the 
universe and its perception, there is a gap, an interval, shorter or longer, which 
thus determines the difference—in degree, not nature—between the matter of 
the world and its perception. This interval is purely temporal.
Nevertheless, to Deleuze, the core of cinema, or its differential mark, is to 
create a shock in thought by the communication of vibrations, directly reaching 
our nervous and cerebral system. The temporality of moving images not only 
has the function of giving continuity to actions in a logical-sequential form, 
but most of all it has the function of creating vibrations in our nervous and 
cerebral system. Since it is time in its non-empiric form that appears between 
the two regimes of moving images (the movement-image and the time-image), 
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it is “the absolute and ultimate Difference” (Deleuze, 2000, p. 41) that is not an 
extrinsic difference between the two regimes. A difference provokes a crisis in 
the concept of truth. Moreover, that is Antonin Artaud’s point of view: cinema 
as a neurophysiologic vibration. Raymond Bellour analyses the rapprochement 
between the “mirror neurons” and the issue of the brain in Deleuzian philosophy. 
He explains the influence of neurosciences in Deleuze’s philosophy of film in 
a new way:
We notice, and this is essential, that these two types of break between neurons are 
analogous to the comparison that Deleuze makes between The Movement-Image and 
The Time-Image, between the types of link belonging to each of these two main forms 
of image: the rational interval of the action image, the irrational interstice that makes 
the crystal-image (Bellour, 2010, p. 83).
In the end, this influence means that “[t]here is no science of the cinema. 
There is no science of the viewer; there are only the spectator’s thoughts and 
experiences” (Bellour, 2010, p. 92). Therefore, the only criterion Deleuze has 
to evaluate the quality of the films he analyses as “good” or “bad” seems to 
be not only of a technical order (editing, the plot, the types of shots, etc.), but 
also the film’s capacity (thinking-images) to make us think philosophically, 
with the possible creation of concepts. In this sense, Patricia Pisters (2012) 
proposes a third type of moving image— the neuro-image that comes from the 
future, grounded in the time of death. There is no possible representation of 
death or of the future; they are the category of the new that escapes the logic 
of representation, the empty time of Thanatos.
5 Do Films Philosophize? Some final, but inconclusive, remarks
Stanley Cavell (1979) and Gilles Deleuze argue that both experimental, 
self-reflexive, and popular movies can illustrate philosophical problems as well 
as positively contribute arguments and ideas not yet thinkable by philosophers 
alone— not only in the sense that cinema is a privileged tool to disclose and 
promote philosophical ideas, but in the sense that it is philosophical. Cinema is 
understood as a philosophical praxis. However, the question that guided Deleuze 
in his quest and in his writing of the Cinema books concerned the difference 
of cinema when related to other forms of art, specifically what cinema was 
giving us that we could not find in literature, in photography, in painting, or 
even in philosophy, or at least, what cinema was giving philosophers that any 
other art form could not give. This would be its cinematic techniques to express 
temporality, movement, and also gesture. 
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With its aberrant movements and irrational cuts, with its indices of 
equivocity, between images and between images and sounds, cinema creates 
a suspension of disbelief in the world, not to show the act of thinking (what 
to think and how) but to show what is not thinkable (Schefer, 1997). To quote 
What Is Philosophy?: “[Hubert] Damisch has insisted more than other writers 
on art-as-thought and painting-as-thought” (Deleuze; Guattari, 1994, p. 233). 
When we mention “pensive images” or “images-that-think”, most of the time 
we are referring to photographed and painted images. Damisch asks what it 
means for a painter to think, and finds his answer in Pollock’s unique style:
On the floor I am more at ease. I feel nearer, more a part of the painting, since this 
way I can walk around it, work from the four sides and literally be in the painting. 
[...] When I am in my painting, I’m not aware of what I’m doing. It’s only after a sort 
of “get acquainted” period that I see what I have been about. I have no fears about 
making changes, destroying the image, etc., because the painting has a life of its own. 
I try to let it come through. It is only when I lose contact with the painting that the 
result is a mess (Pollock, 1947-48, p. 79).
Still, if art is a form of thinking (as Hubert Damisch and Roland Barthes 
claim), why should cinema be considered as a form of philosophizing? By 
distinguishing the true nature of film—the creation of blocks of space-time, 
the filling/delimitation of the plane of composition with affects and percepts 
(sensations)—from its philosophical appeal, we expose the functioning of 
thought in a non-conceptual shape (to think with no concepts, to think with 
images and sounds), and give philosophy a non-philosophical understanding 
of itself. In this sense, our aim with this essay was to conceptually develop the 
elaboration of a philosophy of film—not so much as Stephen Mulhall’s radical 
“philosophy in action” (2001), but as a “praxis, or action-thought” (Deleuze, 
2008, p. 156) according to which we can “think in cinema through cinema” 
(Deleuze, 2008, p. 160).
To think philosophically is not to apply “ready-made concepts” (Deleuze, 
1995, p. 50), or simply recognise. Likewise, to use film as the illustration/
adaptation of a philosophical theory or of a philosophical concept is to stop 
movement, to use moving images as still images that fit a priori conceptual 
work (Dwyer, 1999).
In this research, I have expanded the idea of image described in section 3. 
Since we are no longer comparing “thinking with concepts” to “thinking with 
images”, but differentiating what “thinking with concepts” and “thinking with 
movement-images/time-images/…” consist of, in cinema, the thought is not 
added a posteriori to still images, but these moving images are immediately 
thinking-images, the “involuntary” origin of thought— a conceptual montage/
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assemblage of the thoughts that once we had (to repeat the poetic title of Thom 
Andersen’s essay film from 2015, “partially inspired” by Deleuze’s Cinema 
books), but which we do not own and did not wish-for.
In second place, it becomes even more ambiguous that through that identity 
(film as philosophy), a film may be considered as fundamental a work to the study 
of philosophy as a book (verbal language, or the traditional literary medium). 
As a result, from a philosophical point of view a film may be at the same level 
as a philosopher’s writings—not to mention philosophers who were or are 
filmmakers, a topic to be dealt with elsewhere. That would be Deleuze’s odd 
position: “Theoretically, Godard would be capable of filming Kant’s Critique 
or Spinoza’s Ethics, and it wouldn’t be abstract cinema or a cinematographic 
application” (Deleuze, 2003, p. 141). Although the link between philosophers 
and filmmakers may be strong, its strength is not in their expressions (via a more 
or less abstract adaptation) but within its exclusive creative nature: sensations 
which express, which make sensible the virtual side of the event that cannot be 
actualized, thus sharing with philosophy the non-empirical form of time of the 
event. To think in film within an aesthetic or philosophy of art with philosophy’s 
own resources (verbal language) is different from thinking of cinema exclusively 
through cinema (non-verbal language of the audio-visual). 
The difference in Deleuze’s approach is that, for him, film concepts, such 
as the affection-image in Griffith’s close-up, are created by philosophy—it is 
the necessary condition for the plane of immanence—, but after the moving 
images (after the close-up in Griffith’ The Musketeers of Pig Alley). If images 
and sounds and their montage provoke a shock to thought, in a movement that 
goes from images to thought, from percepts to concepts, Deleuze also mentions 
its reverse, from thought to images, or affects (2008, p. 154). In this case, we 
create figures and metaphors. But Deleuze’s use of metaphors should be taken 
carefully, as for him a metaphor can easily be reduced to the cliché that he tried 
so hard to eliminate from philosophical thought; a metaphor is thus a pseudo-
concept because it is always mediated by representation.
Finally, what is the role of a philosophy of film and of thinking film in our 
everyday life? Films have to do with our lives, our present moment; movies 
are not just stories, but they dialogue with us, they test our values, our limits, 
our prejudices and our tolerance. We cannot deny that moving images can be 
seen as a democratization of thought—the film theatre seen as a modern ágora. 
As a consequence, the philosophical debate may leave the traditional academic 
circuits of the discipline, and even as simple an act as watching a movie can, 
intentionally or not, be touched by philosophical ideas. Some movies invite us 
to philosophical debate and reflection. Some movies give us the tools to critical 
thinking, by not showing us what to think but how.
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Nevertheless, does this way of approaching philosophy not have a tendency 
to oversimplify thought with a superficial elaboration of a popular philosophy? 
Not necessarily. In 1973, Deleuze took part in Richard Pinhas’ musical project 
by reading aphorism 638 of Human, all too Human, by Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Once again, he was searching “for new means of philosophical expression” 
(Deleuze 1994, p.xxi), possibly a pop’philosophie as a tool to disclose the 
philosophical text in a non-habitual philosophical environment (Leclercq, 
2005, pp. 150-151). In this particular case, philosophy is no longer seen as the 
conceptual creative activity but in an eclectic sense, as closer to the “popular 
philosophy” defended by Noël Carroll: 
That in addition to being a very well designed and polished Hollywood exposé, Sunset 
Boulevard also performs the function of popular philosophizing—of bringing to mind 
truths about the human condition that have been forgotten, neglected, or repressed 
(2009, p. 196).
As a consequence of the argument of this essay (on the difference between 
“thinking” and “philosophizing”), we may say that this does not mean the 
announced democratization of philosophy, but of thought—shared with other 
artistic forms such as painting, architecture, graphic novels, etc.. This position 
struggles with a natural resistance. Because film-philosophy was not an obvious 
solution, Cavell and Deleuze’s efforts during the 1970s and 80s were received 
with suspicion within the traditional philosophical community. The problem was, 
first of all, one of philosophical style and expression. To quote Robert Sinnerbrink, 
“We might call this the problem of giving voice to philosophy’s encounter with 
film, and to film’s opening up of philosophy to cinematic exploration” (2014, 
p. 51). As he argues, the connection between film and philosophy in this film-
philosophy model is also a transformative (not illustrative) experience, opening 
the philosophical field to new ways of expression that challenge what we think 
the philosophical praxis to be.
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